

**ICIP WORKING PAPERS:  
2014/07**

# **The EU Regional Security Complex between 2001 and 2011 in relation to the threat from Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction**

Alessandro Demurtas

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# The European Regional Security Complex between 2001 and 2011 in relation to the threat from Islamist terrorism and weapons of mass destruction

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Barcelona, november 2014**

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### **Typesetting and printing**

Àtona Víctor Igual, S. L.

### **ISSN**

2014-5793 (online edition)

### **DL**

B. 26545-2014



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Alessandro Demurtas is an researcher on international and European relations and international peace and security. This paper is based on the doctoral thesis of its author: «The European Regional Security Complex between 2001 and 2011 in relation to the Islamist terrorist threat and weapons of mass destruction» defended in November, 2014 at the Public Law and Historical and Legal Sciences Department of the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona.

## ABSTRACT

This work draws on a theory formulated by the Copenhagen School in order to determine if the European Union (EU) can be characterized as a regional security complex (RSC) in relation to the threats of Islamist terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To accomplish this task, this research combines the use of two theories developed by the Copenhagen School: the RSC theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003) and the securitisation theory as described by both authors and Jaap de Wilde in 1998.

On the basis of the three-fold need to (a) expand studies on security, (b) to use a regional approach to address the most important security dynamics and, (c) to explain the changes experienced by the international system of the post-cold war period, the fundamental objective of the research is to determine the viability and applicability of RSC theory to the EU. This work applies to the study of the security practices of actors capable of regional influence – the EU, NATO, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany – to the military sector of multidimensional security focus as envisaged by the Copenhagen School. In this way, it explains how the European security system evolved at the beginning of the 21st century in relation to two specific threats: Islamist terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This work is divided into four sections. The Overview outlines the issues regarding objectives and research. The second section provides an explanation of the Methodology used and of the patterns

of analysis. The third section details the Results achieved at the operational level and finally, the Conclusions put forward some general considerations regarding the applicability of the theories selected for research, the European RSC and, the possible future applications of the RSC theory.

**Subjects:** securitisation, regional security complex, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction

## RESUM

Aquest treball utilitza una teoria emmarcada als estudis de l'Escola de Copenhaguen amb l'objectiu de determinar si la Unió Europea (UE) pot caracteritzar-se com un complex de seguretat regional (RSC en el seu acrònim anglès) en relació a les amenaces del terrorisme de matriu islamista i de les armes de destrucció massiva (ADM). Per realitzar aquesta tasca, la present investigació fa un ús combinat de dues teories elaborades per l'Escola de Copenhaguen: la teoria dels RSC de Barry Buzan i Ole Waever de l'any 2003 i la teoria de la securització que els dos autors elaboren juntament amb Jaap de Wilde el 1998.

Partint de la triple necessitat d'ampliar els estudis sobre seguretat, d'utilitzar un enfocament regional per abordar les més importants dinàmiques securitàries i d'explicar els canvis que ha viscut el sistema internacional de la postguerra freda, l'objectiu fonamental de la recerca és determinar la viabilitat i l'aplicabilitat dels resultats de la teoria dels RSC a la UE. Aquest treball aplica l'estudi de les pràctiques de seguretat dels actors amb capacitat Regional —UE, OTAN, França, Regne Unit, Espanya, Itàlia i Alemanya— al sector militar de la seguretat multidimensional que preveu l'enfocament de l'Escola de Copenhaguen. D'aquesta manera, s'explica com ha evolucionat el sistema europeu de seguretat en relació a dues amenaces a principis del segle XXI: el terrorisme de matriu islamista i les ADM.

El treball està dividit en quatre apartats. En la presentació general es detallen els objectius i les preguntes d'investigació. En el segon apartat s'ofereix una explicació de la metodologia utilitzada i de les

pautes d'anàlisi. En el tercer apartat es detallen els resultats aconseguits a nivell operatiu. En les conclusions es fan algunes consideracions generals sobre l'aplicabilitat de les teories triades per a la investigació, sobre el complex europeu de seguretat regional i sobre les possibles aplicacions futures de la teoria del complex de seguretat regional.

**Descriptors:** securització, complex de seguretat regional, terrorisme, armes de destrucció massiva

## RESUMEN

Este trabajo utiliza una teoría enmarcada en los estudios de la Escuela de Copenhague con el objetivo de determinar si la Unión Europea (UE) puede caracterizarse como un complejo de seguridad regional (RSC en su acrónimo inglés) en relación a las amenazas del terrorismo de matriz islamista y de las armas de destrucción masiva (ADM). Para realizar esta tarea, la presente investigación hace un uso combinado de dos teorías elaboradas por la Escuela de Copenhague: la teoría de los RSC de Barry Buzan y Ole Waever del año 2003 y la teoría de la securitización que los dos autores elaboran junto con Jaap de Wilde en 1998.

Partiendo de la triple necesidad de ampliar los estudios sobre seguridad, de utilizar un enfoque regional para abordar las más importantes dinámicas securitarias y de explicar los cambios que ha vivido el sistema internacional de la posguerra fría, el objetivo fundamental de la investigación es determinar la viabilidad y la aplicabilidad de los resultados de la teoría de los RSC a la UE. Este trabajo aplica el estudio de las prácticas de seguridad de los actores con capacidad regional —UE, OTAN, Francia, Reino Unido, España, Italia y Alemania— al sector militar de la seguridad multidimensional que contempla el enfoque de la Escuela de Copenhague. De esta manera, se explica cómo ha evolucionado el sistema europeo de seguridad en relación a dos amenazas específicas a principios del siglo XXI: el terrorismo de matriz islamista y las ADM.

Este trabajo está dividido en cuatro apartados. En la presentación

general se detallan los objetivos y las preguntas de investigación. En el segundo apartado se ofrece una explicación de la metodología utilizada y de las pautas de análisis. En el tercer apartado se detallan los resultados conseguidos a nivel operativo. En las conclusiones se hacen algunas consideraciones generales sobre la aplicabilidad de las teorías elegidas para la investigación, sobre el complejo europeo de seguridad regional y sobre las posibles aplicaciones futuras de la teoría de los complejos de seguridad regional.

**Descriptor:** securitización, complejo de seguridad regional, terrorismo, armas de destrucción masiva

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CFSP	EU Common Foreign Security Policy
RSC	Regional security complex
UN	The United Nations
USA	United States of America
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
CFSDP	Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy





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# 1. GENERAL PRESENTATION

## 1.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the investigation were twofold. In the first place, using the theory of securitisation, it strives to determine the relationship between the security dynamics of the units analysed, treating the EU as a dependant variable, the States chosen as independent and explicative variables and NATO as an intervening variable. In the second place, concentrate within the security inter-relations framework of the units to describe and explain the eventual existence of the European Regional Security Complex (European RSC), the variables that make it up and the tendencies towards the maintenance of the status quo or change it has experienced between 2001 y 2011.

In summary, the idea is to confirm the explanatory potential of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), with a constructivist slant/bias and several institutional elements, as opposed to other more classical explanations in International Relations, based on intentions, interests and the context. In other words, the present work proposes to study the EU's strategic and security practices, of NATO and of Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Germany during a ten-year period (2001-2011). Using operational instruments and guidelines for analysis afforded by RSCT, once the similarities and differences, compatibilities and incompatibilities have all been surveyed, the objective is to corroborate the existence of a correlation between these practices and the securitisation processes derived thereof.

## 1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The principal questions steering the investigation are the following:

1. Based on the analysis of discourse and of the EU's strategic and security practices, of NATO and the States analysed, can we con-

firm the existence of the European RSC in relation to the threat of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs?

1. If this is so, what is the eventual structure of the European RSC?
2. In the specific cases, do the EU and its member states share the threats? And which specific actions and acts have the units studied undertaken to ensure their security?
3. In the environments where the perceived threat is shared, is it possible to find a common initiative or does the division between the States and the EU persist? And, how does NATO influence these environments?

The principal research questions and the set of three sub-questions, serve to determine whether in the chosen states and in the EU – which provides the institutional framework around which the European RSC must be structured – share the most important Islamist terrorism and WMDs securitisation processes. Moreover, the role played by NATO in the structuring and consolidation of the European RSC is studied, treating it as an intervening variable. In other words, thanks to the analytical tools and the conceptual framework offered by RSC securitisation theory, the thesis tries to determine whether it is possible to verify the existence of a significant level of exchange and interdependence of the principal security processes and dynamics between the States analysed, the EU and NATO.

## 2. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL GUIDELINES

### 2.1. METHODOLOGY

In order to proceed with the methodology, it is firstly necessary to establish certain operational criteria to enable the application of the chosen theories. The work applies the theory of securitisation to each state analysed, the EU and NATO, carrying out a study organized over different stages, whose numbers vary depending on the unit analysed.

In general, in order to determine whether securitisation exists, we must be able to corroborate the existence of the politicisation of the chosen threat:<sup>1</sup> for the five States, we study the spoken statements given by public authorities (Head of state or of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and articles taken from a leading nationally distributed newspaper. For the EU and NATO, the existence of politicisation is corroborated through the analysis of public speeches and statements respectively of the EU's High Representative for CFSP and NATO Secretary General. There are no newspapers distributed among all EU or NATO member states. For this reason, the second stage of politicisation is not applied to the two principal organisations responsible for security in Europe.

The next stage of securitisation concerns the adoption of certain specific emergency measures to counteract the threat studied. In order to do this, measures adopted by the national Governments of five States, the European Council and NATO are studied. The final phase consists in corroborating whether or not public opinion accepts the politicisation of the threat managed by public authorities,

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1. By politicisation of the threat we refer to the discursive process (speech acts) by which an authority considered legitimate by public opinion deals with an issue concerning security as a threat. The politicised issue, and converted into a threat, is no longer dealt with by the standard instruments of public policy instead it begins to be dealt with by the actor in question's security and defence policy instruments.

through the analysis of national public opinion surveys and, in the case of EU, the *Eurobarometer*. As there are no public opinion surveys regarding NATO, this stage is not applied to the Atlantic Alliance.

Table 1 summarizes the stages that allow us to apply the securitisation theory operationally to the units used as a case study. We should remember that the analysis consists of 4 stages for the states, 3 stages for the EU and two stages in the case of NATO.

This study allows us to determine the existence of a securitisation process in the units chosen for the study, being the first methodological step required in order to be able to confirm the existence of the European RSC in relation to each point of inflection chosen to study the threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs.

In order to complete the investigation, we must add an analytical dimension to the theory of securitisation applied individually to the States, the EU and NATO. Our objective is to determine whether or not there is a sufficient degree of interrelation and interdependence of the securitisation processes between the units analysed, which represents a required condition for the existence of European RSC. As we stated previously, it is necessary to answer the following questions:

1. Are security issues regarding security. Is it successfully securitised by any of the actors?
2. If the answer is yes, it is then necessary to trace the relationships and interconnections between it and the remaining units in the system: Are there any consequences for the security of the remaining actors and for other security-related issues?
3. What response do the other actors in the system offer?
4. We must compile the interrelations between the system units as if they were a coherent group of security concerns, evidencing the interrelations and determining whether the existence of European RSC can be confirmed. Interrelations and exchanges of security dynamics may occur in accordance with a horizontal logic between States or according to a double vertical logic, from top to bottom and vice versa.

**Table 1:** How to determine the existence of the securitisation processes in the different units chosen as case studies

UNITS → Stages ↓	GERMANY	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	UNITED KINGDOM	EU	NATO
1. Public authorities speeches or statements	Chancellor + Foreign Aff. Minister	President of the Government + Foreign Aff. Minister	President de la Republic / Prime Minister + Foreign Aff. Minister	Prime Minister + Foreign Aff. Minister	Prime Minister + Foreign Aff. Minister	High Representative for the CFSP	General Secretary
2. National newspapers	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	<i>El País</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Corriere della Sera</i>	<i>The Daily Telegraph</i>	–	–
3. Adoption of specific measures	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
4. Public opinion surveys	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	<i>Eurobarometer</i>	-

Source: prepared by the authors.



5. In the latter part of the investigation we analyse the four variables that constitute the European RSC structure: patterns of amity and enmity; the anarchic structure and the effects derived from the balance of power; the distance effect and the pressures derived from the geographic proximity of the threat; the borders of the RSC. In addition, we strive to determine whether the European RSC has an evolution towards internal, external transformations, or towards the status quo.

In summary, the methodology used is based on two lines of investigation. The first line attempts to corroborate whether, in the units chosen as case studies, there is a successful securitisation for the threat studied. The second line is designed to determine whether or not there is a sufficient level of interdependence between the individual securitisation processes and whether or not it is possible to demonstrate the formation and consolidation of the logics and dynamics particular to regional security. These features are a required condition for us to be able to confirm the existence of European RSC in relation to each point of inflection chosen to study the threats from Islamist terrorism and WMD.

## 2.2. THE SUBDIVISION AND TEMPORIZATION OF THREATS

In order to determine the existence of the European RSC at an operational level in relation to the threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs, we believe that it is necessary to make a double methodological clarification. Firstly, it would have been physically impossible to perform an uninterrupted analysis over a ten-year period for both threats due to the prodigious amount of data involved. Because of this, we consider it necessary to perform a double subdivision of the threats studied that enables greater flexibility in the analysis.

We refer to a double subdivision of threats because, firstly, Islamist terrorism and WMDs are divided into **subcategories** or sub-dimensions that permit greater simplicity in the delimitation of the field of

research and facilitate operative application of the chosen theories. Furthermore, we consider the sub-dimensions selected allow us to study the more important aspects of each threat.

The **Islamic terrorist threat** shall be studied therefore from the following sub-dimensions:

1. Islamist terrorism associated with the organization of central Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks against the US;
2. regional franchises of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that allows us to study the Islamic terrorist threat placing the emphasis on its huge geographic nature;
3. the threat derived from Islamic terror cells on European soil, whose actions are justified by way of a discourse inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden;
4. the Afghan issue and its importance in the fight against terrorism.

The study of the **threat of weapons of mass destruction** is also based on a division into four sub-categories. The first category is related to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons amongst non-state actors, which include terrorist organisations. This enables us to relate the terror threat with that of WMDs. The remaining three categories refer to three specific States, included in the «axis of evil» as per the President of the USA, George W. Bush, in the «US National Security Strategy» (George W. Bush, 2002).

The following are the four sub-categories which are used as a basis for studying the threat of WMDs:

1. the fight against the proliferation of WMDs, which is focused around the anthrax terror attacks carried out on US soil after September 18, 2001 (known as *Amerithrax*) and on the discovery of a laboratory for manufacturing ricin oil in London on January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2003 (known as the castor oil «ricin plot»). The

study of this category enables us to stress the threat derived from phenomena such as the so-called, «bio-terrorism» and «chemical terrorism»;

2. the Iraqi threat, after the US led invasion of Iraq together with its allies in March, 2003, without prior authorization from the UN Security Council. Within the framework of the «Bush Doctrine» priority is given to the need to combat «Rogue States», responsible for offering support to terrorist groups and to developing WMD production capability, including the possibility of exercising a preemptive strike against them (George W. Bush, 2002);
3. the threat from the proliferation of the Iranian nuclear program;
4. the North Korean nuclear threat.

As we have already stated, we perform a double sub-division of the threats studied. The first one is concerned with the sub-category of each threat we have just mentioned. The second sub-division consists in selecting certain significant «inflection point» events that took place between 2001 and 2011, relative to the threats. We refer to these events as «inflection points». Each of these has significant implications for European security in relation to the threats of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. We selected seven inflection points in relation to each threat, capable of encompassing the four sub-categories into which the two threats are sub-divided.

In other words, the thesis before you does not intend to perform a ten-year uninterrupted analysis of the selected material, but rather concentrates on the weeks or months prior to and after each inflection point. In this way, it will be easier to register the presence of changes in the European security context and determine the interrelations and interdependence between the different securitisation processes which occur within the States analysed, the EU and NATO. This decision is justified by the same authors from the Copenhagen School who, in *Regions and Powers*, state that «regional security complexes [...] are built socially because they depend on *the security practices* of their actors. Depending on what or who the actors secu-

ritice, the region may reproduce or change» (Buzan and Waeber, 2003: 48). Because of this, the investigation aims to corroborate the eventual existence of the European RSC at seven specific moments relative to each threat and, in the event of having an affirmative response, to describe how the European RSC is structured at each point in time.

The chosen **inflection points** in relation to the Islamic terrorist threat are the following:

1. 2001: the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the USA carried out by Al Qaeda, which triggered a global war on terrorism and the intervention in Afghanistan on October 7<sup>th</sup>;
2. 2004: the terrorist attacks of March 11<sup>th</sup> (11-M) in Madrid;
3. 2005: the terrorist attacks of July 7<sup>th</sup> (7-J) in London;
4. 2009-2011: the kidnapping of European citizens by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb region (AQIM);
5. 2009: December 2<sup>nd</sup>, Barack Obama announces at West Point the new strategy for Afghanistan, which foresees the deployment of a further 30,000 US troops in the region;
6. 2010: October 29<sup>th</sup> (29-O), two letter bombs are intercepted at two different airports in Dubai and in the United Kingdom, in an attack prepared by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and targeting the USA;
7. 2011: the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2<sup>nd</sup>.

The **inflection points** chosen to study the threat of WMDs are the following:

1. 2001: between September 18<sup>th</sup> and November 16<sup>th</sup> several terror attacks involving anthrax are carried out in the USA, in what has come to be known as *Amerithrax*;
2. 2003: in January, police in London discover a laboratory where allegedly ricin is being developed to be used in a terrorist attacks;
3. 2003: the war in Iraq on March 20<sup>th</sup>;
4. 2005: the Iranian government decides to recommence its ura-

mium enrichment program in August despite the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) recommendations to the contrary;

5. 2006: first North Korean nuclear test since October 9<sup>th</sup>;
6. 2009: second North Korean nuclear test on May 25<sup>th</sup> and UN Security Council resolution n<sup>o</sup> 1874 on June 12<sup>th</sup> imposing tougher sanctions;
7. 2010: as a consequence of the worsening situation with the Iran crisis, on June 9<sup>th</sup> the UN Security Council adopts a new resolution (n<sup>o</sup> 1929) imposing tougher sanctions on Iran. These include powers designed to introduce a total arms embargo, greater scrutiny over the country's financial and banking activities and transactions and the drafting of a blacklist of Iranian companies who are forbidden from investing abroad.

After this analytical task, we continue applying RSC theory going to great lengths to ensure precision. In other words, we attempt to determine which type of regional security complex corresponds to the European RSC (standard, centred, of the major powers, super-RSC) or do we eventually register its absence (overlapping or unstructured RSC). We place special emphasis on determining whether or not Buzan and Waever's thesis would be confirmed. These two authors, in *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security* (Buzan and Waever, 2003) state that the EU complex is characterised as being a sub-type known as institutionalized RSC centred around the EU.

In addition, we describe the structure of the European RSC based on an analysis of its four structural variables (patterns of amity and enmity, anarchy, distance effect and confines) to determine its development between 2001 and 2011: internal transformation, external transformation or maintaining the status quo. In summary, the investigation implements the following analysis guidelines:

1. Creation of a database as described below that would enable operational implementation of the theory of securitisation to the actors studied.

2. Operational implementation of the theory of securitisation to each unit chosen as a case study.
3. Corroboration, for each inflection point of the existence of the European RSC in relation to the threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs.
4. Analysis of the four variables that make up the European RSC in relation to each point of inflection, if its existence is confirmed at an operational level.
5. Study of the evolution of the European RSC between 2001 and 2011 in relation to the threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs.

To perform the investigation we analysed a total of 2076 documents: 662 speeches, interventions, parliamentary appearances and interviews (speech acts) from elected public representatives; 1206 articles from five nationally distributed newspapers; 131 legal acts and other official documents and 77 public opinion polls. These documents enable us to study each stage of the securitisation process of the threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs in the units chosen as a case study.

The following Table indicates the total amount of document sources used in order to carry out the investigation:

**Table 2:** Documentary sources used for the investigation

SOURCES CONSULTED	QUANTITY
Speech acts of public authorities	662
Articles in national press	1206
Specific emergency measures	131
Public opinion polls	77
<b>TOTAL: 2,076</b>	

*Source:* prepared by the authors.

### 2.3. ELABORATION OF THE VARIABLES BASED ON CONTENT ANALYSIS

In order to perform an operational analysis on such a huge amount of data it is necessary to call on conceptual and methodological tools made available by content analysis, which can be defined as «a systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of the characteristics of a message», a useful analysis tool for the study of news reported by the media, for politicians speeches and for legal acts which authorize specific actions (Neuendorf, 2002: 1).

The investigation follows the specific steps intended for the content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002: 50-51), as detailed below. In the first place, the RSC and securitisation theories are selected which allow us to establish the objective of the study (the EU RSC in relation to the threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs).

The second step is to select the material to be used in the study:

1. During the weeks, and in some cases, months prior to and after the inflection points, selecting state public authorities' speech acts, the EU and NATO which make explicit mention of the existence of a derived threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs, or by the symbiosis the two threats. From all the speeches given by the authorities, the analysis is based exclusively on those which refer to at least one of two threats studied.
2. During the weeks, and in some cases, months prior to and after the events chosen as inflection points, we select the articles from the nationally distributed newspapers which relate terrorism and WMDs with the security of the units studied. In other words, of all the articles from newspapers that mention the events chosen for the study, only the ones that link or relate the threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs with the security of the actors in question are analysed.
3. The emergency measures adopted by actors are chosen for their direct response in the face of the constituted threat. They must fulfil the following criteria: these must be measures adopted by

the national Government, the European Council and NATO; they must be of an operational or legislative nature, in other words, that they must have legal value; their existence must be capable of being corroborated in official acts which are legally valid (such as laws, decrees, documents from the European Council, statements or NATO action plans, etc.); the adoption of measures must be a direct consequence of the threat being studied in the chosen point of inflection.

4. The national public opinion polls and *Eurobarometer* data selected deal specifically with the issues of Islamist terrorism and WMDs in periods subsequent to inflection points and the securitisation of the threat. This is because their function is to determine whether public opinion effectively shares the politicisation of the threat conveyed in speech acts by public authorities and in articles in the national press.

Successively the variables are conceptualized, by way of a detailed analysis of the material studied. The third step consists in making these variables operational, in other words in the establishment of the necessary criteria in order to measure the variables through precise indicators and mutually excluding categories.

Next, we undertake the elaboration of a codebook and an analysis file, which provides all the detailed instructions required to proceed with making these variables operational. The fifth step consists in the selection of a sample of the content to be analysed, which enables us to test the efficiency of the coders and the reliability of the chosen variables (sixth stage). We select a total of 300 documents for the sampling, which corresponds to about 15% of all the material used for the investigation. All categories and indicators have demonstrated their validity and have been confirmed.

The seventh stage is the coding of the material studied, respecting the instructions established in the codebook and in the analysis file (please see Appendix A and B at the end of this study). The eighth step is the final analysis of all the data and the elaboration of a definitive investigation report, detailing the relationships between variables



to determine the applicability of the theories chosen to the cases analysed.

The elaboration of the variables is performed based on three different analytical dimensions, each of which is constituted by different sub-dimensions or indicators: this conceptual distribution has enabled the elaboration of a database comprising 21 operational variables. The first analytical dimension is purely descriptive, given that it exclusively contains variables relative to basic identification data, thanks to which it is possible to clearly catalogue the material employed in the study, allowing other individuals to use the database. The second and third dimensions relative to the construction of the threat and the adoption of emergency measures contain the operational and explicative variables that allow for the effective application of the chosen theories to the case studies.

The Table below provides the coding diagram that summarizes the entire apparatus relative to the variables elaboration process:

**Table 4:** Coding diagram of the principle variables of the study

DIMENSION	SUB-DIMENSION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE NUMBER	CODED DATA
1. Basic identification data	1. Speeches by public authorities	DIS_ACT	1	Unit studied (States, EU, NATO)
		DIS_FEC	2	Date of speech
		DIS_AUT	3	Public authority of speech act
	2. Press articles	ART_PER	4	Name of newspaper
		ART_FEC	5	Date of article
		ART_NUM	6	Page number

2. Construction of threat	1. Identification of threat	AME_TER	7	Terrorist threat
		AME_WMDs	8	WMD threat
		AME_DOS	9	Symbiosis between two threats
	2. Securitized object	OBJ_MIL	10	The object securitised is military security
		OBJ_CIU	11	The object securitised is public security
		OBJ_VAL	12	The objects securitised are values and way of life
		OBJ_ECO	13	The objects securitised are strategic and economic interests
3. Adoption of emergency measures	1. Adoption level of measures adopted	NIV_EST	14	State level adoption of measures
		NIV_REG	15	Regional level adoption of measures
		NIV_INT	16	Extra-European and international level adoption of measures
	1. Type of measures adopted	MED_MIL	17	Use of military personnel
		MED_PRE	18	Increase in prevention or intelligence
		MED_CON	19	Increase in internal controls
		MED_SAN	20	Imposition of sanctions
		MED_DER	21	Restrictions of human rights and individual freedoms

Source: prepared by the authors.

The coding diagram above allows for the descriptive and exploratory regrouping of the data collected. Nevertheless, in order to reach higher measurement levels which guarantees greater scientific rigour in the investigation, we must establish a subsequent coding diagram for the aforementioned variables, especially in the cases where we are not dealing with dichotomous variables – whose value can be yes or no. In this way, we can represent the different associated variables used for the statistical analysis which are not reflected by the foregoing 21 principle variables, which represent a regrouped value which does not allow for a high margin of operationalization and abstraction.

This task is indispensable for the second analytical dimension for the investigation, relative to the construction of the threat, within which there are numerous nominal variables that represent the regrouped value of other associated variables, which are vital in order to perform the analysis according to the selected methodology. More specifically, the sub-dimension relative to the securitised object is the only one that presents variables that are a result of the combination of two or more associated variables (variables from 10 to 12).

As we have previously stated, variable 10, referring to military security as a securitised object is the result of the association of three dichotomous variables that indicate the presence or absence of a phenomenon, explaining whether the actor whose security is presented as being under threat, is a state, the EU or NATO.

Variable 11, concerning public security, can be measured at a practical level only after it has been broken down into two dichotomous variables that indicate whether the securitised object is the individuals' life or the continuation of day-to-day social life, which is interrupted when people begin to «live in fear». Variable 12, which registers the eventual danger for the values of a specific reference community, is made up of three dichotomous variables that specify whether we are dealing with the state, European or western values community. In any case, the principle variables from 10 to 12 can measure the presence of a specific phenomenon every time it is possible to register a reference to each one of the original variables associated with them.

Table 5 describes the regrouping of the variables for a statistical analysis:

**Table 5:** regrouping of the variables for a statistical analysis

DIMENSION	SUB-DIMENSION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE NUMBER	ORIGINAL ASSOCIATED VARIABLES
Construction of the threat	1. Identification of the threat	AME_TER	7	-
		AME_WMDs	8	-
		AME_DOS	9	-
	2. The securitised object	OBJ_MIL	10	10-a Threat to EU security: OBJ_SUE  10-b Threat to state security: OBJ_NAC  10-c Threat to NATO security: OBJ_OTA
		OBJ_CIU	11	11-a Danger for the lives of individuals: OBJ_VID  11-b Rupture of day-to-day social life: OBJ_RUT
		OBJ_VAL	12	12-a Threat to values of a state: OBJ_EST  12-b Threat to European values: OBJ_EUR  12-c Threat to western values: OBJ_OCC
		OBJ_ECO	13	-

Source: prepared by the authors.

Once the statistical analysis of the data used has been performed, the theory of securitisation encounters its operational implementation in each one of the actors chosen for the study, in other words the five States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), the EU and NATO. The next stage of the investigation consists in applying the RSC theory.

## 3. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION

There are four specific questions about the EU RSC which act as guidelines for the investigation:

1. How is the EU RSC arising from each point of inflection structured?
1. How does each threat evolve between 2001 and 2011?
2. How does the EU RSC evolve in relation to each threat studied between 2001 and 2011?
3. What general considerations can be deducted from a comparative analysis of the different stages of the EU RSC relating to each threat?

### 3.1. EU RSC IN RELATION TO THE ISLAMIC TERRORIST THREAT

We use 1261 documents to carry out the analysis: 346 speech acts from the public authorities; 786 articles from the five chosen national newspapers; 86 specific emergency measures adopted by state governments, the EU and NATO; 10 public opinion surveys from *Eurobarometer* and 33 national public opinion polls.

The following table shows a summary of the types of EU RSC arising from each point of inflection:

**Table 6:** Type of EU RSC arising from each inflection point in relation to the threat of Islamic matrix terrorism

INFLECTION POINT	TYPE OF EU RSC
11-S terrorist attacks, 2001 and armed intervention in Afghanistan	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
11-M terrorist attacks, 2004 in Madrid	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU

Terrorist attacks of 7-J, 2005 in London	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
Kidnapping of European hostages by AQIM between 2009 and 2011	Partial evidence of the existence of an Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
December 1, 2009: program at West Point about Afghanistan	Partial evidence of the existence of an Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
29-O, 2010 terrorist attacks using letter bombs by AQAP against the USA	Inapplicability of RSC theory
May 2, 2011: death of Osama bin Laden	Inapplicability of RSC theory

*Source:* prepared by the authors.

The **evolution of the terrorist threat from Islamist terrorism** can be divided into three major stages between the years 2001 and 2011. In the initial stages, which cover the years between 2001 and early 2004, the study is focused on the terrorist threat represented by Al Qaeda as a consequence, principally, of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the USA.

During the second stage of the development of the study (from March 2004 until 2008), the analysis focuses on the threat derived from terrorist cells present on European soil, which carried out attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005). During this second stage, the threat from Islamist terrorism by Al Qaeda is characterized by being internal to European territory.

During the third stage of the study (2009-2011), the construction of the terrorist threat is structured around two main concepts. The first concept is the activities of the regional franchises of Al Qaeda which are active in Islamic Maghreb (the kidnapping of European hostages between 2009 and 2011 by AQIM) and on the Arabian Peninsula (the attack using letter bombs sent from Yemen on October 29<sup>th</sup>, 2010 by AQAP). In the second place, there is a need to strengthen the fight and international cooperation in the area of counterterror-

ism, studied in the inflection points relating to the speech at West Point by Barack Obama (December 2, 2009) and the death of Osama bin Laden (May 2, 2011).

The first five inflection points analysed securitize a real and concrete danger, which is materialized in the terrorist attacks they provoke (or intend to provoke, as is the case with 29-O) casualties and material damages for the European states: these are the terrorist attacks of 11-S, 2001, 11-M, 2004, 7-J, 2005; of the foiled terrorist attempts of 29-O, 2010 and of the kidnapping of European hostages by AQIM between 2009 and 2011.

Unlike these others, the last two inflection points make reference to a potential threat for European countries. The securitisation of Afghanistan (West Point speech) is based on the possible unsettling effects on the stability and regional security of the Broader Middle East<sup>2</sup> – with direct consequences for European security – derived from the loss of control of the Asian country. The potential threat securitised is that Afghanistan could once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda in the event that it falls under the aegis of the Taliban. The securitisation of the terrorist threat derived from the death of Osama bin Laden arises from the possible reprisals which groups associated with Al Qaeda could carry out in revenge for their leader being eliminated.

In the final stage of the decade studied, relating to the four inflection points between 2009 and 2011, the security agenda of European countries is focused on the need to strengthen the prevention efforts in the face of a threat perceived, in a double sense, as being more diffuse. In the first place, the perception is disseminated that the threat of Al Qaeda might represent a danger to security in several areas around the globe: Maghreb, Arabian Peninsula and Afghanistan. The central axis of the threat is no longer only its capacity to strike in European or US territory: due to its geographic dispersion, the focal point of the fight against Al Qaeda shifts to the regions and states

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2. Term officially used with the launch of the «G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative» (BMENA) in 2004.



where their greatest bases have been established, such as the Sahel, Yemen or Afghanistan.

In second place, the potential goals and securitised objectives are various: the lives of European nationals abroad (kidnapped by AQIM), European air safety (foiled terrorist attacks of October 29, 2010 perpetrated by AQAP), the stability of Afghanistan and its potential consequences for security in European countries (speech at West Point in 2009) and a widespread fear of reprisals from Al Qaeda for the killing of bin Laden in 2011, both within and outside European territory.

The **evolution of EU RSC** arising out of the threat of Islamist terrorism between 2001 and 2011 follows a pattern in relation to the evolution of the threat studied. As we have already seen above, the terrorist threat arising out of the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 terrorist attacks favours the formation and the development of an European institutional RSC, centred around the EU. The second stage of evolution of the terrorist threat, relating to cells present in Europe, is focused around the 11-M terrorist attacks in 2004 and of 7-J in 2005. The European RSC arising out of these two inflection points continues to be institutional, around the EU.

In relation to the third stage of the evolution of the terrorist threat (2009-2011), we have varying results, depending on the inflection point analysed. We find partial evidence of the existence of the European institutional RSC, centred around the EU, in relation to two inflection points: the kidnapping of European hostages by AQIM between 2009 and 2011 and the securitisation of Afghanistan generated by the speech by Barack Obama in West Point, December 2, 2009.

We refer to partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC due to the impossibility of registering successful securitisations in all of the units chosen as case studies. The evidence found allows us to conclude that the development of the European RSC follows the same pattern adopted in the two stages prior to the evolution of the terrorist threat: the EU continues to represent the institutional centre around which all political, legal, economic and financial cooperation between member states designed to combat the Islamic terrorist threat is structured.

In relation to the last two inflection points analysed, the attacks of October 29, 2010 and bin Laden's death on May 2nd, 2011, we find ourselves faced with the impossibility of applying RSC theory in the case of the EU. This is because none of the units chosen as case studies successfully securitise the terrorist threat. As we have already stated on several occasions, one of the required conditions for the existence of a RSC is the interdependence of securitisation processes between the units in the complex.

The first two developmental stages of the threat from Islamist terrorism (attacks of 11-S, 11-M, and 7-J) spark the forming and consolidation of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU. Progress made during these years (2001-2008) continues to represent today the political, legal-normative and institutional framework where strategic practices of the units comprising the European RSC are developed, which enables us to discuss logic and the regional security's own dynamics.

During the third developmental stage of the Islamist terrorism threat (2009-2011) there are political and institutional developments in the regional European environment, however they remain insufficient to be able to state categorically that the regional security dynamics prevail over state dynamics. The impossibility to corroborate the existence of the European RSC in the third stage of the development of the terrorist threat can be explained by two factors. Firstly because institutional development of a regional security dynamics undergone between 2001 and 2008 offers us the tools and framework for action sufficient in order to fight against Islamist terrorism. The second factor is relating to the nature of the threat itself. The first two developmental stages of the threat from Islamist terrorism (2001-2008) are focused on the attacks perpetrated against the US and its European allies. Due to these three attacks, (11-S, 11-M y 7-J), terrorism appears as a multi-dimensional threat (having consequences for military, political, economic safety as well as the societal security), geographically diffuse and ever-present, capable of striking its enemies from within its borders at any time and in any place. This new trait of the threat forces European states to restructure their antiterrorist policies.

The threat from Islamist terrorism analysed in the third stage (2009-2011) is different in two ways. In relation to regional franchises of Al Qaeda (AQIM and AQAP) and in Afghanistan, the geographic location places them in a specific area, outside European territory. Despite the fact that the letter bombs used in the attacks of 29-O were also discovered in the English airport of East Midlands, the attacks were unsuccessful. In relation to Afghanistan and the death of Osama bin Laden, as we have already stated, the terrorist threat is of a potential nature.

The results obtained enable us to divide the development of the EU RSC arising in relation to the Islamic terrorist threat into two phases. The first phase covers the period from 2001 to 2008 and is related to the following inflection points: 11-S, 2001, 11-M, 2004 and 7-J, 2005. These three terrorist attacks spark the formation of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU. We define this first stage as the «institutionalist stage» of the European regional security logic: the response from the European RSC units to the terrorist attacks on the US, Spain and United Kingdom is one of progressive institutionalization of the regional security dynamics in the face of the terrorist threat.

The EU is the central actor around which regional security dynamics are institutionalized in different areas. Among these, we wish to highlight cooperation between police forces, judiciary, intelligence community, border control bodies (through Schengen visas), prevention in the face of new attacks and air security. On the other hand, NATO strengthens the formation of regional security logic, by representing the principal institution where European states decide to cooperate militarily in order to guarantee their security in the face of the threat of Islamist terrorism.

The second stage of EU RSC evolution covers the period between 2009 and 2011. We refer to this second stage as the «stage of rational and limited cooperation» between EU member states. These decide to cooperate in specific areas related to the Islamic terrorist threat, in other words, in relation to a demarcated geographic area and outside EU territory (Maghreb and Afghanistan) or in relation to specific aspects of security (air security). Progress made during this «institutionalist stage» continue to lay the foundations for the development of

a dynamic specific to regional security, however these are focused on specific aspects of the terrorist threat and they have a complementary character with regard to state security dynamics.

Due to the changes in the four variables which constitute the essential structure of an RSC (patterns of amity and enmity, distance effect, anarchy, confines), this might have three possible developments: the first is the maintenance of the status quo. The second is internal transformation, characterized by structural changes within the borders of the RSC. The third is the external transformation, when there are changes in the borders, due to expansion or contraction, or of the members of the RSC.

We corroborate the existence of the EU RSC arising from the terrorist threat only between the years from 2001 to 2008. The comparative analysis of these years enables us to demonstrate two complementary tendencies relative to the evolution of the EU RSC. The first is the maintenance of the status quo in qualitative terms: there is a progressive institutionalization of the regional security dynamics that allows us to confirm the existence of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU. Moreover, the institutional developments – which occur throughout the EU in relation to antiterrorist cooperation – enable us to confirm a strengthening of the regional security dynamics at a political, normative, legal and institutional level.

On the other hand, the EU RSC also registers external transformations in the period between 2004 and 2007. There is an expansion of the confines of EU RSC at these two points in time which are not related to the terrorist threat, but instead with the extension of the EU towards Eastern Europe. On May 1, 2004, the EU grew to have 25 member states with the admission of Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and the Czech Republic. On January 1, 2007, the EU grew to 27 member states with the admission of Bulgaria and Romania.

It is worth considering the fact that these two enlargement processes of the EU are almost parallel and successive to those of NATO. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic enter NATO on March 12, 1999, with its fourth enlargement process. The fifth expansion of

NATO took place on March 29, 2004 and includes Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. The only two countries which are Members of the EU since 2004 and which are not part of the NATO are Cyprus and Malta.

In the latter part of this section, we strive to make certain **forecasts** about the European RSC relating to the terrorist threat. Analysis of the ten-year period between 2001 and 2011 shows us the appearance of the European RSC exclusively as a consequence of direct and successful terrorist attacks against the region of the European countries (and the US). When the terrorist threat becomes more specific (geographic location outside the EU) or the distinct nature (of a potential character), we encounter the impossibility to confirm the existence of the European RSC.

The most likely prediction is that it would be difficult to be able to register the reappearance of the European RSC without there being another successful terrorist attack, targeting EU member states or their closest allies (NATO). Institutional progress registered for the European RSC during the institutionalist stage (2001-2008) represents a solid base for multi-dimensional cooperation in the face of the threat from Islamist terrorism. It is difficult to predict that these advances might be modified and register a qualitative change without the appearance of a threat of a shocking nature, such as the terrorist attacks of 11-S, 11-M and 7-J. Without the appearance of an inflection point relating to Islamist terrorism which has significant repercussions for the regional security dynamics, state logic will continue being priorities. Cooperation between EU states in the fight against terrorism of an Islamist inspiration will in all probability be, «rational and limited», as was the case in the period between 2009 and 2011.

In the years ahead, the antiterrorist fight in the EU will continue to be multi-functional to adapt to the nature of the threat. Next to «classical» terrorist attacks, such as those perpetrated on 11-S, 11-M and 7-J, there exists the risk of attacks with CBRN weapons, which leads us to refer to «chemical terrorism», «bioterrorism» and «nuclear terrorism». In recent years, the risks derived from terrorist attacks against cyber security are also on the rise. The principle dangers derived from

cyber-crime are the attacks directed against «critical infrastructures» of the EU states. On October 20, 2004, the European Commission issues a communique to the Council and the European Parliament in which it defines critical infrastructures as being «those installations, networks, services and physical IT equipment and technology whose interruption or destruction might effect a significant repercussion to the health, security or economic wellbeing of citizens or in the efficient working of the governments of member states» (European Commission, 2004).

### 3.2. EUROPEAN RSC IN RELATION TO THE THREAT FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

We used 816 documents to perform the analysis: 316 speech acts of public authorities; 421 articles from the five chosen national newspapers; 45 specific emergency measures adopted by state governments, the EU and NATO; 4 surveys from *Eurobarometer* and 30 national public opinion polls/surveys.

In the table below we summarize the type of European RSC arising out of each point of inflection:

**Table 7:** The type of EU RSC arising out of each point of inflection relating to the threat of WMDs

POINT OF INFLECTION	TYPE OF EU RSC
2001: <i>Amerithrax</i>	Partial evidence of the existence of a institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
2003: ricin laboratory dismantled in London	Partial evidence of the existence of a institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
2003: the war in Iraq	Absence of a RSC: security proto-complex
2005: restart of Iran’s nuclear program	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU

POINT OF INFLECTION	TYPE OF EU RSC
2006: first North Korean nuclear test	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
2009: second North Korean nuclear test	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU
2010: UN resolution 1929 against Iran	Institutional European RSC, centred around the EU

*Source:* prepared by the authors.

In accordance with the seven inflection points chosen for the investigation, the **evolution of the threat from WMDs** between 2001 and 2010 can be divided into two stages or moments. The first stage covers the period between September 2001 and January 2003. The two inflection points studied for this period are the *Amerithrax* incident (September-November 2001) and the discovery of the ricin plot in London (January 2003). The perception of the threat from WMDs by EU states is focused on the risks of proliferation towards non-state actors, especially terrorist organisations.

The effects from the September 11, 2001 attacks on the security agenda of the countries studied are immediate: terrorism becomes the number one priority among the threats to military security. In addition, suspicions that Al Qaeda might be behind *Amerithrax*, which were only denied in 2008, as well as the discovery of the ricin plot add a new and worrying dimension to the terrorist threat: this is the possibility that the terrorists were able to use WMDs to carry out an attack, exponentially multiplying its devastating effects. This process means that the threat of proliferation of WMDs begins to be perceived as one of the most serious threats to the security of EU member states.

The second stage of the evolution of the perception of the threat from WMDs covers the period between March 2003 and 2010. The inflection points studied for this period are the alleged possession of WMDs by Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, which is the justification for the war in Iraq (March 2003), the uranium enrichment program in

Iran (2005 and 2010) and the two nuclear tests carried out by North Korea (2006 and 2009). The perception of a threat from WMDs is now focused on the three states included in US President George W. Bush's «axis of evil» in the «National Security Strategy of the United States of America» of September 2002 (George W. Bush, 2002).

Despite the fact that the war in Iraq began on March 20, 2003, the politicization of the threat began the foregoing months: public authorities from the five states analysed begin to securitize the Iraqi threat in 2002. In this sense, we can thereby state that there is a period of overlapping between the two evolution phases of the threat from WMDs, corresponding to 2002 and the early part of 2003.

The evolution of European RSC relating to the threat from WMDs follows a pattern associated with the evolution of threat. The first stage of the **evolution of the threat from WMDs** concerns two inflection points: *Amerithrax* and the ricin plot. In relation to this phase, the analysis demonstrates partial evidence of the existence of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU. This is because not all the units analysed successfully securitize the threat from WMDs. In both cases, we register a high degree of interdependence between the securitisation processes of the five states analysed. Moreover, one can perceive a certain progress in the institutionalization of the dynamic specific to regional security, thanks to the actions of the EU and, to a lesser degree, NATO.

The third point of inflection concerns the threat derived from the alleged possession of WMDs by Iraq, which draws the USA and some of its allies into a war on March 20, 2003. This event represents a moment of fracture in the evolution of European RSC. The analysis demonstrates the absence of a RSC and the presence of a security proto-complex: there is security interdependence between the units in the system which enables us to differentiate it from other RSC; however the regional dynamics are too weak to uphold the existence of a RSC. The divisions between European countries over the conflict in Iraq provoked the paralysis of institutions in the EU, the rupture of friendly relations between states in favour and against the war and the ap-



pearance of different perceptions regarding the Iraqi threat. Anarchy between EU member states is Lockean: the relationship between countries in favour of the war (United Kingdom, Spain and Italy) and the countries against (France and Germany) cause rivalry and each block of countries acts according to its own interests, each one weighing up the costs and benefits to themselves and not those of the whole group of units in the system. State logic takes precedence over the logic of regional security.

In the third stage of European RSC evolution, the perception of the threat from WMDs for European countries is focused on nuclear programs being developed by the two remaining countries in President George Bush's «axis of evil»: Iran and North Korea. In each point of inflection chosen for the study, we can confirm the existence of an institutionalized European RSC, centred around the EU. Our study registers a high degree of interdependence between the securitisation processes of the states analysed: there is a sharing of the threat, there is unconditional support for the actions of the EU-3 + 3 group<sup>3</sup> (in the Iranian case) and there is the adoption of specific emergency measures derived from the normative framework of the EU and the UN Security Council resolutions.

Furthermore, in the case of North Korea, European states do not adopt national measures to counteract the threat. On the contrary, the EU member states limit themselves to immediately applying legislation adopted by the European institutions, aware of the need to provide a common and coordinated response to counteract this threat. We define this phenomenon as the «Europeization» of specific actions of EU states.

The **evolution of the European RSC** between 2001 and 2010 is based around three different stages. The first stage covers the period between 2001 and 2003 and corresponds to the inflection points relative to *Amerithrax* in the USA and the discovery of the ricin plot in London. The analysis allows us to extract only partial evidence of the existence of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU.

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3. UK-FRA-GER+USA+RUS+CHI.

We define this stage as the «pre-institutionalist stage» of the European RSC: not all the units chosen as case studies successfully securitize the threat from WMDs arising out of the two chosen inflection points. Despite this fact, we register a high degree of interdependence between the state securitisation processes and, above all, the favours a certain progress in the institutionalization of the dynamics specific to regional security.

Between September 2001 and the middle of 2003, the EU adopts four measures we can define as being the «institutional embryo» of European RSC. The first two measures are designed to combat specific threats such as «bioterrorism» or «chemical terrorism». The final two measures, on the other hand, represent the general political and normative framework within which EU directives for action are drawn up in order to address the more general threat of the proliferation of WMDs. This is the «Community mechanism for facilitating a strengthened cooperation in aid interventions in the area of civil protection» of October 23, 2001 (European Council, 2001), of the Cooperation program for the preparation and response to attacks using chemical and biological agents (Health security)» dated December 17, 2001 (European Council, 2001), of the «Declaration on weapons of mass destruction» dated June 20, 2003 (European Council, 2003b) and «EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction», adopted by the European Commission on December 10, 2003 (European Council, 2003a).

The «pre-institutional stage» of European RSC development comes to an abrupt end in March 2003, when the war in Iraq breaks out. This event represents a moment of rupture in European RSC development, which is only highlighted by its absence. We can register the presence of a security proto-complex: there is security interdependence between the units within the system which enables it to be distinguished from other RSC; however the regional dynamics are too weak to support the existence of a RSC.

The overcoming of this moment of rupture in European RSC development occurs in 2005, with the worsening of the situation relating to the Iranian nuclear dossier. From 2005 until 2010, when the tem-

porary study horizon of European RSC relating to WMDs comes to a close, we enter the «institutionalist stage». In relation to the four inflection points chosen, relating to the nuclear threat coming from Iran and North Korea, we can confirm the existence of an institutionalized European RSC, centred around the EU.

Due to the changes in the four variables that constitute the essential structure of a RSC (amity and enmity, distance effect, anarchy and confines), this might have three possible evolutions. The first is maintaining the status quo, the second is the internal transformation, characterized by structural changes within the confines of the RSC and the third is the external transformation, when there are changes in the confines, due to expansion or contraction, or of the RSC members.

As has been stated previously, we can corroborate the existence of the European RSC arising from the threat from WMDs only between the years 2005 to 2010. This developmental stage of the European RSC is preceded by a moment of rupture in European RSC development, corresponding to the war in Iraq in March 2003, which brings the «pre-institutionalist stage» of the period between 2001 and 2003 to an end. For this reason, we can register a trend towards the internal transformations of the European RSC: we have partial evidence of the existence of an institutionalized European RSC, centred around the EU, between the period 2001 and 2003. In March 2003, we registered the absence of an RSC and the presence of a security proto-complex. After 2005, we can confirm the presence of an institutionalized European RSC, centred around the EU.

If we focus exclusively in the years after 2005, corresponding to the «institutionalist stage» of the European RSC, the comparative analysis allows us to evidence the trend towards maintaining the status quo in qualitative terms: there is a progressive consolidation of the institutionalization of regional security dynamics which allows us to confirm the existence of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU.<sup>4</sup> The European Council adopts specific measures to combat the

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4. The European RSC also is subject to an external transformation due to the entrance of

nuclear proliferation of Iran and North Korea, which represents the common and «Europeized» response of its member states. Apart from the community regime of sanctions and restrictive measures against these two countries, we emphasise the action of the «UE3 + 3 Group», in which Germany, France and the United Kingdom participate, and the High Representative of the EU for PESC, Javier Solana, in the negotiations with Iran. On the other hand, in relation to the North Korean nuclear threat, European states limited their response to supporting the work of the countries which take part in the «conversations between the six parties» which, apart from North Korea, include South Korea, Japan, China, USA and the Russian Federation.

In the latter part of this section we aim to provide several **predictions** regarding European RSC relating to the threat from WMDs. As we saw in the analysis, we can confirm the existence of the European RSC only in relation to the inflection points related to the threat of nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea. The events related to «bioterrorism» (*Amerithrax*) and «chemical terrorism» (the ricin plot) can only permit us to extract partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC.

As a result, it is reasonable to expect the appearance of the European RSC in two specific events which are different. The first is the deterioration of the situation relating to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. In the case of Iran, if there was a suspension in the negotiations about the development of its nuclear program and a general deterioration in diplomatic relations. In the case of North Korea, if the regime in Pyongyang were to carry out another nuclear test or decides to attack South Korea or Japan. In both situations, it is to be expected that the actions of the EU and its member states would take place in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions.

There is a second supposition in which the appearance of the EU RSC is to be expected. This would be in the case of a successful terror-

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Romania and Bulgaria into the EU, on January 1, 2007. This change is not related with the development of the EU RSC or the WMD threat.

ist attack, carried out using chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons against EU countries or their close allies (NATO). The existence of threats from «bioterrorism», «chemical terrorism» and «nuclear terrorism» – derived from the symbiosis between the terrorist threat and WMDs – on its own, does not appear to be enough to induce the development of regional security dynamics and interdependent securitisation processes, required conditions for the existence of the European RSC. In order for this to occur, it is reasonable to believe that a terrorist attack using WMDs would be successful.

As we have already seen, the outbreak of the war in Iraq provoked a rupture in European RSC development, with its consequent absence and the appearance of a security proto-complex. It is therefore appropriate to ask oneself in which events might we register a new moment of rupture. The most likely prediction is in the case of outbreak of a war carried out against a country which is a proliferator of WMDs, especially in nuclear terms, as is the case with Iran and North Korea. In this supposition, if the countries of the EU were to be divided into those who support and those who are against the war – as occurred in the case of Iraq – we would once again register the absence of the European RSC and the appearance of a security proto-complex.

## 4. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

### 4.1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF RSC AND SECURITISATION THEORIES

The theory of securitisation developed by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde in 1998 remains to this day a theory widely studied and applied. When it comes to its operational application, we encounter three main problems.

1. The first is the massive volume of data and documents to be pooled. This is the case because the application of the theory of securitisation is made up of several stages: four for the states, three for the EU and two for NATO.

2. The second issue of an operational nature we face when it comes to the operational application of the securitisation theory is the difficulty in sourcing certain documents. This is because, in some cases, on various national government websites, the public speech acts belonging to previous legislations are not present. This problem has been resolved by way of consulting the history for the websites in question. Furthermore, in order to consult articles from *Le Monde* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* it was necessary to consult paying sources.

3. The third problem is of a heterogeneous nature of the kind of data we handle, especially evident when it comes to analysing specific emergency actions of the units chosen as case studies. For the five EU states, (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), we refer to laws, decrees and other legislative or governmental acts. For the EU we use all types of documents adopted by the European Council in several areas (PESC, PESD-PCSD, JAI, common trade policy, etc.): these are actions, positions and common statements, strategies. In some cases we refer to documents drafted by the European Commission. In relation to NATO, we draw on all the documents available from the Alliance's website (plans of action, actions, declarations, decisions).

We do not avail of previous studies regarding operational implementation of RSC theory. For this reason, we find ourselves with more problems of an operational nature concerning this theory.

1. Firstly, RSC theory shares the three operational difficulties of the theory of securitisation: the immense quantity of data to be managed, difficulty of finding said data and, in some cases, its heterogeneity.

2. Secondly, the applicability of RSC theory varies, depending on each case and the particular moment chosen for the study. This means that in order to compare one RSC at different moments we must repeat the study from the beginning for each inflection point chosen. This implies a remarkable amount of time and effort on the investigator's part.

3. The third operational difficulty of this theory concerns the conditions required to exist in order to corroborate the existence of an RSC. Due to the fact that this can only be confirmed when there is a sufficient level of interdependence between securitisation processes of its units, during the investigation we can see how on certain occasions the theory is difficult if not impossible to apply.

4. The fourth problem, associated with the previous one, is the ambiguity of the theory when there is only partial evidence of the existence of a RSC. This case occurs when not all the units register successful securitisation processes for the threat studied or when they register partially successful processes. In several inflection points relative to the two threats studied we can confirm the existence of partial evidence of an institutional European RSC, centred around the EU. One objection that might generate this confirmation is that European RSC either exists or it does not exist, in other words, that its existence is not a phenomenon that can be put into context. In the present investigation we opt to indicate partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC despite not being able to corroborate its existence in all of its aspects.

In spite of the operational difficulties encountered when it comes to the application of RSC theory to the European case, it is fitting to also

highlight its utility. In general, RSC theory enables us to analyse, comprehend and explain the reality from an entirely new and innovative perspective. This is because it allows us to study the phenomenon of the regionalization of security through the perspective of the «lens» of securitisation. This means that this is the first theory that allows us to comprehend the phenomena the regionalization of security based on the perspective of the shared construction and perception of the threat. In short, we consider that – despite the aforementioned methodological and operational difficulties – the results obtained from this investigation are satisfactory and we emphasise the utility of the RSC theory.

#### 4.2. GENERAL CONCLUSION CONCERNING EUROPEAN RSC

1. RSC theory is not applicable to all the inflection points chosen for the analysis. In relation to the threat from Islamist terrorism, we confirm the existence of the European RSC arising out of the successful terrorist attacks against the USA (11-S, 2001), Spain (11-M, 2004) and the United Kingdom (7-J, 2005). In two cases – the kidnapping of European hostages in the Maghreb by AQIM between 2009 and 2011 and the speech at West Point given by Barack Obama in 2009 – we find partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC. In a further two cases – the failed terrorist attacks by AQAP of 29-O, 2010 and the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 – we find ourselves faced with the impossibility of operational application of the RSC theory.

2. In relation to the threat from WMDs, we confirm the existence of the European RSC in relation to the threats derived from nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea. In the case of Iraq in 2003, the theory is applicable but we register the absence of the European RSC and the presence of a security proto-complex. In a further two cases – *Amerithrax* in 2001 and the «ricin plot» of 2003 – there is only partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC.

3. The third general consideration that we can extract from the previous data is that the applicability of RSC theory, as we have stated previously, depends on the inflection point chosen for the analysis.



The fourteen inflection points analysed in this investigation do not enable us to confirm that this theory has a validity and universal applicability. In 8 out of 14 of the cases we can apply it in all its aspects. In only 4 cases we can avail of partial evidence of the existence of the European RSC, which would give rise to problems of ambiguity when it comes to discussing the applicability of the theory. Finally, in 2 cases we cannot apply RSC theory because no unit chosen as a case study registers the complete and successful securitisation of the threat analysed.

4. Focusing on the two threats studied, we notice that the RSC theory is applied in two specific circumstances. In the case of Islamist terrorism, when there are successful terrorist attacks with a large amount of victims and which demonstrate the vulnerability of western countries to the threat: 11-S, 11-M and 7-J. In the case of WMDs, when the threat is identified with one specific state: in the case of this investigation, the nationalization of the threat from WMDs corresponds to the «axis of evil», a term elaborated by George W. Bush in 2002: Iraq, Iran and North Korea (George W. Bush, 2002).

5. Other considerations of a general nature that we can deduce from the investigation concern the two regional organisations studied: the EU and NATO. The EU represents the political-institutional centre which lay the bases of European RSC, when it is possible to corroborate its existence. The High Representative for CFSP, titled the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy after December 1, 2009, politicize the threat placing the emphasis on the regional security dimension, either by referring to the dimension of EU military security or securitizing European values on several occasions. The European Council, for its part, adopts legislative acts which institutionalize regional cooperation and coordination between EU states in several areas: political, policing, judicial, economic, commercial, strategic, for the cooperation for development, for border control and air security. In addition, polls from *Eurobarometer* enable us to analyse perceptions of public opinion in Europe as a whole: during the period covered by the investigation, the EU increases the number of its member states from 15 to 27.

6. On the other hand, NATO is treated as an intervening variable in this investigation. Our objective is to find out the role it plays in the formation and consolidation of the European RSC. The Atlantic Alliance plays a double role in this process. In the first place, in several circumstances, the Secretary General politicizes the threat by highlighting the regional security dimension, either by making reference to the dimension of military security of NATO, or by securitizing the strategic values and interests of the Alliance. In the second place, NATO opts in the majority of occasions to implement emergency measures of a military nature (deployment of air, naval or terrestrial operations; territorial surveillance and defence operations, among others) which strengthen the framework of security cooperation between its allies. NATO continues to represent the principal threshold for European military defence and its actions in the face of the threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs continues to remain focused on the military dimension of security.

7. These considerations bring us to the conclusion that the two principal organisations responsible for security in Europe play a complementary role in the formation and consolidation of the dynamics and regional security logic which lay the foundations for European RSC. The EU focuses its efforts on bolstering the legal-legislative, political, institutional, judicial, policing and economic-commercial areas. NATO mainly focuses on the military aspects. This in no way impedes the EU from carrying out on occasion missions of a military nature, especially in the area of CFSDP.

8. There are certain general considerations we can draw from the comparative analysis of the European RSC relating to the threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs. There is a high degree of interdependence and interconnection between securitisation processes of the units chosen for the case studies. These processes register similarities in the majority of the cases. We confirm this data in the politicization phase of the threat (identification of the threat, reference military dimension, securitised objects), in the type of specific measures adopted and in the perception of public opinion, in the case of the five states and the EU.

9. The only case where divergence between the state securitisation processes was registered – and which caused the paralysis of the European Council – is related with the Iraqi threat and with the armed intervention in Iraq in 2003. In this case, there is an absence of the European RSC and the presence of a security proto-complex.

10. In reference to the politicization phase of the threat, the investigation demonstrates that the securitisation of Islamist terrorism refers to different securitised objects, principally western values, individual lives and strategic interests. On the other hand, securitisation of WMDs refers to a reduced quantity of securitised objects, among which the ones that stand out are western values and the continuation of day-to-day social life. Moreover, in the securitisation processes of WMDs there are fewer references to the military dimension of security when we compare this with Islamist terrorism.

#### 4.3. POTENTIAL FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF RSC THEORY

The third objective of the final conclusions is to provide suggestions about the potential future application of RSC theory. In relation to European RSC, the analysis of the threats studied in this investigation might apply to other states. This would provide us with a more comprehensive vision of the formation and consolidation processes of European RSC. For example, the role of Turkey, situated as it is between European RSC and Middle East RSC, as a «buffer state» might be studied.

A further interesting example to extend this investigation might be to add the perspective of the Nordic countries belonging to the EU (Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) and Norway, which is a member of NATO. This would serve to corroborate the results obtained using the five member states chosen as case studies for the investigation (Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom), in order to have a model for comparative purposes and, eventually, to determine whether the securitisation of the threats studied occur by way of a different logic.

Another interesting perspective which might complement the analysis of the European RSC relating to the threat from Islamist terrorism and WMDs is that of the Eastern European countries who joined the EU in 2004: the securitisation processes of Baltic States might be studied as an example (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). An analysis of this type would enable us to add a fresh geographic perspective to the investigation, including the countries situated at the most eastern confines of the EU and close to the Russian Federation.

On the other hand, RSC theory might be applied to other areas of security, such as economic, political, societal and environmental security relating to the European context. One interesting example of the application of RSC theory to the area of economic security could concern the debt crisis which several Euro region countries went through in recent years, as is the case with Spain, Italy and Greece. In the political and societal, the rise of extreme right-wing movements and political parties in the EU might be studied, such as the case of Golden Dawn in Greece or the National Front in France.

In relation to the military dimension of security, RSC theory might become a useful tool for studying cybernetic security threats. The phenomena of cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime have recently begun to occupy a far more pivotal role on the security agenda of EU member states. In addition, the threat represented by the advance of Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant in Syria and Iraq in recent times might also be the subject of study.

Finally, RSC theory could be applied to other regions. One study that might complement this investigation could be the analysis of securitisation processes of threat of Islamist terrorism and WMDs in the North American RSC (USA and Canada). This would enable us to have a more complete picture of the regionalization of security between countries members of NATO, treated as an intervening variable in this investigation. Moreover, we might therefore obtain a more comprehensive viewpoint of the role played by North American superpower in the consolidation of the logic and regional security dynamics among NATO allies.



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# APPENDIX A

*Code book to analyse the securitisation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, EU and NATO*

## **1) Basic ID data**

V1 [DIS\_ACT]

Which state or organization does the person who made the speech belong to?

1. Germany
2. Spain
3. France
4. Italy
5. United Kingdom
6. EU
7. NATO

V2 [DIS\_FEC]

What date was the speech made?

[Free response, use format DD/MM/YY]

V3 [DIS\_AUT]

Who made the speech?

1. German Chancellor
2. German Minister of Foreign Affairs
3. Spanish President of the Government
4. Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs
5. President of the French Republic
6. French Prime Minister
7. French Minister of Foreign Affairs
8. Italian Prime Minister
9. Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
10. British Prime Minister



11. British Minister of Foreign Affairs
12. EU High Representative for PESC
13. Secretary General of NATO

V4 [ART\_PER]

In which newspaper does the article appear?

1. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*
2. *Le Monde*
3. *Corriere della Sera*
4. *El País*
5. *The Daily Telegraph*

V5 [ART\_FEC]

When was the article published?

[Free response, use format DD/MM/YY]

*Instructions: in the case of having more than one article written on the same day, add a letter to the publication date, beginning with the letter «a».*

V6 [ART\_NUM]

On what page of the newspaper does the article appear?

[Free response]

## **2) Dimension «constructing the threat»**

V7 [AME\_TER]

Does the threat come from Al-Qaeda or from another group of an Islamic terrorist origin?

1. Yes
2. No

V8 [AME\_WMDs]

¿Does the threat come from any particular country?

1. North Korea
2. Iran
3. Iraq
4. No state

V9 [AME\_DOS]

Does the threat emanate from the possibility that a terrorist group could use WMDs?

1. Yes
2. No

V10-a [OBJ\_SUE]

Is the securitised object the military security of the EU?

1. Yes *[including the possibility of direct attacks against the territory, attacks against the armed forces, against critical infrastructures, means of transport, public authorities and, in general, attacks designed to cause a large number of civilian casualties]*

2. No

V10-b [OBJ\_NAC]

Is the securitised object the military security of a state? *[Including the possibility of direct attacks against the region, attacks against the armed forces, against critical infrastructures, means of transport, public authorities and, in general, attacks designed to cause a large number of civilian casualties]*

1. Germany
2. Spain
3. France
4. Italy
5. United Kingdom
6. No state

V 10-c [OBJ\_OTA]

Is the securitised object the military security of NATO?

1. Yes *[Including the possibility of direct attacks against the region, attacks against the armed forces, against critical infrastructures, means of transport, public authorities and, in general, attacks designed to cause a large number of civilian casualties]*
2. No

V11-a [OBJ\_VID]

Is the securitised object the lives of individuals living in the region of the actor studied?

1. Yes
2. No

V11-b [OBJ\_RUT]

Is the securitised object the continuity of daily social life and the correct functioning of the society of the actor studied?

1. Yes [*including the danger of interrupting daily activities which enable the correct functioning of the society, such as work, transport, leisure activities, etc.*]
2. No

V12-a [OBJ\_EST]

Is the securitised object the fundamental values way of life of some state? [*Including values such as democracy, human rights, Rule of Law, respect for human life and individual liberties, prohibition of the use of force against civilian objectives, etc.*]

1. Germany
2. Spain
3. France
4. Italy
5. United Kingdom
6. No state

V12-b [OBJ\_EUR]

Is the securitised object the fundamental values way of life of the EU? [*Including values such as democracy, human rights, Rule of Law, respect for human life and individual liberties, prohibition of the use of force against civilian objectives, etc.*]

1. Yes
2. No

V12-c [OBJ\_OCC]

Is the securitised object the fundamental values way of life, referring to the western community of countries? *[Including values such as democracy, human rights, Rule of Law, respect for human life and individual liberties, prohibition of the use of force against civilian objectives, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

V13 [OBJ\_INT]

Is the securitised object the geopolitical and economic interests of the actor in question? *[Including the security of air or maritime routes, maintenance of spheres of economic influence, security of energy resources supply and maintaining geopolitical and geostrategic balance in a region, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

### **3) «Adoption of emergency measures» dimension**

V14 [NIV\_EST]

Have the emergency measures adopted been established by a government authority of a state?

1. Germany
2. Spain
3. France
4. Italy
5. The United Kingdom
6. No state

V15 [NIV\_REG]

Have the emergency measures adopted been established by a government authority of an EU state or NATO?

1. Yes
2. No

V16 [NIV\_INT]

Have the emergency measures adopted been established by an authority of an international organization (for example, the UN)?

1. Yes
2. No

V17 [MED\_MIL]

Did the emergency measures adopted include the use of military installations, the employment of military personnel or personnel belonging to security bodies? *[Including the sending of air, sea or land based troops, sending of civilian personnel to support or monitoring a mission; sending of personnel belonging to police forces, internal missions to dismantle terrorist cells, access to military installations for allied states, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

V18 [MED\_PRE]

Do the emergency measures adopted include an increase in intelligence workload and prevention measures? *[including the creation of new intelligence bodies; reinforcing cooperation between intelligence apparatus on an internal level, with other states or other international organisations; increase in border controls to counteract arms trafficking or the circulation of terrorists; increase in the presence of intelligence personnel abroad, freezing funds belonging to organisations that are suspected of terrorist activity, reinforcing legal framework, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

V19 [MED\_CON]

Do the emergency measures adopted include an increase in domestic controls on behalf of the actors? *[Including stricter controls in air, sea and rail transportation; increase in police controls on the occasions and events drawing large numbers of the public (such as sports*

*competitions or national holidays); approval of legislation designed to reinforce the prerogatives of the security and police forces; etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

V20 [MED\_SAN]

The emergency measures approved include the approval of sanctions against a state, terrorist group or any other organization? *[Including economic sanctions, trade embargoes, suspension of funding for cooperation and developmental aid, diplomatic sanctions (such as severing of diplomatic relations, withdrawal of ambassadors and official representatives, suspension of granting of visas), political sanctions, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No

V21 [MED\_DER]

The emergency measures approved include the suppression or restriction of human rights and individual liberties? *[Including limitation of free movement of individuals, violation of the right to privacy, decrease in the necessary requirements for police detention, etc.]*

1. Yes
2. No



## APPENDIX B

*Code book for analysing securitisation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the EU and NATO*

### 1) Basic ID data

*[Write the corresponding number indicated in the code book in each box: if a speech made by a public authority is analysed, fill in variables 1 to 3 if it is a public speech and variables 4 to 6 if it is an article in the press]*

V1 DIS_ACT	V2 DIS_FEC	V3 DIS_AUT	V4 ART_PER	V5 ART_FEC	V6 ART_ NUM

### 2) Dimension «construction of threat»

*[Write the corresponding number indicated in the code book in each box]*

V7 AME_ TER	V8 AME_ WMDs	V9 AME_ DOS	V10-a OBJ_SUE	V10-b OBJ_NAC	V10-c OBJ_ NATO

V11-a OBJ_VID	V11-b OBJ_RUT	V12-a OBJ_EST	V12-b OBJ_EUR	V12-c OBJ_OCC	V13 OBJ_INT



### 3) Dimension «adoption of emergency measures»

*[Write the corresponding number indicated in the code book in each box]*

V14 NIV_ EST	V15 NIV_ REG	V16 NIV_ INT	V17 MED_ MIL	V18 MED_ PRE	V19 MED_ CON	V20 MED_ SAN	V21 MED_ DER

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