During the last few decades, research has shown that diasporas can play a significant role in peacebuilding efforts. By using case studies from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka, scholars have argued that diasporas show a willingness to act by sending remittances or acting as social and cultural bridges between their homeland and country of settlement. Indeed, they can participate in lobbying and advocacy efforts, and contribute to skills and knowledge transfer. Thanks to their extensive national and transnational networks, they can also contribute to reconciliation and conflict prevention efforts.[1]
Such work to raise awareness regarding diasporas’ agency in peace and conflict processes has made diasporas visible in peacebuilding landscapes. Policymakers and other stakeholders have started paying attention to issues related to victimhood and justice by including diaspora members in their agenda – practically or discursively. While the first-generation diaspora members who migrated mainly for conflict-related motivations have been long considered in research literature on peacebuilding efforts, the role that the so-called second and third generations of the diaspora can play has been largely overlooked. Whereas the focus has been on the so-called first generation, the migrants who have arrived in a new country of settlement, their children and grandchildren appear to be less interested in issues related to their parents’ homeland. Thus, they participate to a lesser degree, if at all, in the political and civic spheres of their ancestral homeland.
Diasporas can participate in lobbying and advocacy efforts, and thanks to their extensive national and transnational networks, they can also contribute to reconciliation and conflict prevention efforts
Studies have shown that the second and third generations continue to be interested in the events in their parents’ homeland. However, to a lesser degree than their parents and, significantly so, in a different manner than their parent’s generation.[2] The descendants of the first generation are embedded in the social spaces that transcend well beyond the political and national spheres of their countries of birth. In concrete terms, this means that they are familiarised with their ancestral homeland through existing kinship relations, through narratives and information of homeland events in the news media. At times, migrants’ children might even hold dual citizenship and be directly involved through such a status in the political and institutional spaces of their parent’s homeland.
A diversity of factors such as pre-existing networks, family ties or associative structures that the second and third-generation members have access to due to their parents’ migration often enables their peacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, second-generation members, often more familiar with virtual spaces and tools, can resort to technological means to become politically active in their parents’ homeland. It is not uncommon that the second, and to some degree, the third generation also identifies partially with their parents’ ethnicity, all the while identifying themselves as citizens of their country of birth.
Conflicts compel people to migrate. The formation of diasporas usually occurs after the displacement due to the lack of human security conditions in the country of origin. However, in other cases, political developments in the country of origin create motivations for political mobilisation in the homeland. The first generation usually leads diaspora politics, and it forms most diaspora networks, which are then inherited or transformed by subsequent generations.
While the first-generation diaspora members have been long considered in research literature on peacebuilding efforts, the role that the so-called second and third generations of the diaspora can play has been largely overlooked
Future generations in diasporas are not immune to homeland conflicts. They are also affected by ongoing or past conflicts in various ways. Through reliving the past and post-memory accessing mechanisms, some members of diaspora communities may inherit cultural traumas and the willingness to act for peacebuilding and justice, seeking to right the wrongs that affected their ancestors’ life trajectories[3]. They might have formed hybrid identities and developed loyalties to multiple contexts. Such transnational stance comes with opportunities and challenges when engaging with political affairs in contexts of both country of settlement and the homeland. This transnationality not only shapes the lived experiences of the second and third generations but can also be seen in their efforts to participate in peacebuilding in their homeland. Before delving into examples of such efforts, we will briefly discuss the enabling and disenabling factors of such peacebuilding efforts undertaken by diasporas.
Factors shaping diasporas’ transnational participation
Diaspora politics have often been approached through the triadic relationship between the homeland, country of settlement and the diaspora. According to this view, one of the major factors shaping the possibilities for diasporas to mobilise and to take part in homeland affairs, including in peacebuilding efforts, is the political and institutional opportunity structures of both the country of origin and the country of settlement. These refer to diaspora members’, including their descendants’, legal political and social rights, citizenship laws and social policies.
The diaspora can take part in the political processes of the country of origin through long-distance voting if they hold their original citizenship and provided that long-distance voting is legally possible for former residents, who are still citizens of the country. Turkey is an example of this. It became possible to cast long-distance votes for diaspora members in the presidential election in 2014 and the parliamentary election in 2015. In the 2023 elections, the Turkish diaspora constituents formed a 400,000 electorate in France and a staggering 1.5 million in Germany.
In addition to this, discursive opportunity structures, in other words, how the diaspora members can diffuse their message in the public sphere and how they can shape the public discourse to raise support, can also be consequential in shaping diaspora members and their descendants’ possibilities to take part in the political affairs of the ancestral homeland. One such example comes from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe that successfully diffused their message in the European media space during the ISIS attack on the small Kurdish city in Syria, Kobane, during the winter of 2014 and 2015. Notably, the narrative of the Kurdish female guerrilla fighters combatting the ISIS terrorists was a powerful one and one that was used in lobbying the European governments for support.[4]
A diversity of factors such as pre-existing networks, family ties or associative structures that the second and third-generation members have access to due to their parents’ migration often enables their peacebuilding efforts
Also, the bilateral and diplomatic relations between the homeland and the country of settlement are a factor in shaping diaspora members’ transnational participation, enabling or disabling it. One of the most recent examples is from the Russian diaspora, particularly of those members who oppose the current government. The space of participation in Russia’s political sphere has been further curtailed by the hampering of diplomatic relations between Russia and countries where the Russian diaspora has formed. It has been suggested that it makes sense to add the “global community”, in other words, international actors in different assemblages, into this triadic relationship between the homeland, country of settlement and diaspora.[5] Lastly, the transnational dimension is also a pivotal aspect to include since diaspora members’ transnational action is based on transnational networks, affiliations, practices and narratives, either pre-existing or newly created ones. The transnational diaspora networks and associations are one factor that can significantly foster participation in the ancestral homeland’s political processes or, when lacking, impede it.
The second and third generations are more embedded and familiar with the political and institutional opportunity structures in their country of birth, the country of settlement for their parents. Their parents, in contrast, might be more familiar with the political and institutional opportunity structures of the country of origin. Similarly, the second and third generations’ peacebuilding efforts can significantly differ from those of their parents and grandparents. Therefore, it is vital not to automatically approach the subsequent generations’ peacebuilding efforts through the same analytical lenses as employed to their parents’ participation. Indeed, there is a risk of missing some key aspects, as discussed below.
What impacts the peacebuilding efforts of the second and third generations
Through diasporic circulation we approach second and third-generation transnational participation, including in peacebuilding efforts. Through this concept, we refer to transnational engagements and actions through which migrants’ descendants aim to improve the conditions in their parents’ homeland either at a distance (both online and offline) or on site. Their actions can take place via institutional or non-institutional means and include even temporal migration and short-term visits; economic, social, and ‘political’ remittances (such as long-distance voting); lobbying; providing logistical support in times of political disturbance; and online political activism such as blogging, campaigns to raise awareness and so forth.
During peace processes and post-conflict phases especially, second-generation diaspora members’ interest in homeland affairs can be rekindled by significant political developments, and their transnational activism can become more visible and sustained. Dormant diaspora members who did not actively participate in diaspora politics might prefer to do so at critical junctures. In these cases, there are windows of opportunity for these diaspora members to influence decision-making processes in their homeland and the country of settlement. For the second generation to be able to contribute to peacebuilding, we need to understand that several factors are at play.
Through reliving the past and post-memory accessing mechanisms, some members of diaspora communities may inherit cultural traumas and the willingness to act for peacebuilding and justice, seeking to right the wrongs that affected their ancestors’ life trajectories
Firstly, one such factor is the homeland’s political landscape. Taking the Russian war in Ukraine as an example, which has led to the formation of new diaspora movements from both countries, the states’ approaches are very different and open to diaspora influence in both cases. When the political atmosphere is more open, the second-generation diaspora members might engage with homeland actors involved in peacebuilding efforts and collaborate on projects willing to bring positive change.
The second generation has the potential to contribute to national and transnational civil society and mobilise support for the peace agenda that is either rooted in the homeland or encouraged by transnational advocacy. The homeland’s approach towards the diaspora, specifically towards the new generations in the diaspora, is crucial in such cases. Are they accepted as legitimate actors in peacebuilding processes? Are they side-lined and designated to become spectators of such processes by the homeland actors, or is their agency accepted, and are they perceived as a legitimate voice? This depends on the type of conflict, the homeland actors’ expectations of the diaspora and the leverage that the diaspora can have on political processes, among other factors.
Secondly, the second generation’s willingness to contribute to positive change is critical for their contribution to peacebuilding in the homeland. However, this is not enough to make meaningful contributions, as they sometimes face challenges despite their will and leverage. Peacebuilding usually occurs during political transitions that are generally fraught by political instability. Political landscapes in the homeland may show tension, political rivalry, and mistrust. Deep-seated distrust and divisions among different ethnic, religious, or social groups may pose challenges to reconciliation efforts. Overcoming historical animosities and building trust is a complex and time-consuming process.
During peace processes and post-conflict phases especially, second-generation diaspora members’ interest in homeland affairs can be rekindled by significant political developments, and their transnational activism can become more visible and sustained
Homeland’s political elites may perceive diasporas as a security threat or a source of instability. Moreover, diasporas might be perceived as dissidents or those who left the country in conflict; therefore, their legitimacy might be questioned during political transition. Previous literature shows that diaspora interventions are sometimes not welcomed by political elites or the stayers in the homeland.[6] Those who never left in times of hardship might question diaspora interventions and not treat their actions as organic to the society they left behind.
Moreover, diaspora perceptions of peace might differ from local perceptions. This has been the case in Cyprus, where the Cypriot youth in the diaspora and on the island have divergent opinions regarding the definition of a peaceful future for Cyprus.[7] The second generation, which has no prior experience of the ancestral homeland context, might feel doubly side-lined by such approaches. In some cases, the issue of “dual loyalties” can be put forward by the political elites of the homeland. The second-generation diaspora members’ loyalty to their ancestral homeland can be questioned as they are embedded in both country of residence and origin contexts. There could also be legal and policy barriers which hinder second generations’ actions. In some cases, they might not have the citizenship of their parent’s homeland, or they might not have the right to vote or stand in elections.
Thirdly, the second generation’s ability to participate in peace, coexistence, and dialogue processes can be characterised by the political landscape in the country of settlement. Previous literature shows that diasporas are not homogenous and might reproduce the political dynamics and ethnic/religious/ideological cleavages of their country of origin in their new countries of settlement. These fragmentations within diaspora groups can also be transformed by spatial and temporal factors in the transnational space, and new divisions might occur in the countries of residence. Those second-generation members interested in diaspora politics might find it hard to align themselves with diaspora organisations as they sometimes do not find such fragmentations meaningful. In other cases, research shows that their parents’ decisions highly influence them, and they develop loyalties towards their ancestors’ political orientations and mobilisation patterns.[8]
When the political atmosphere is more open, the second-generation diaspora members might engage with homeland actors involved in peacebuilding efforts and collaborate on projects willing to bring positive change
Lastly, besides such inherent factors, the country of settlement’s approach towards the diaspora’s involvement in homeland politics is essential. In some cases, such transnational engagements are encouraged by the governmental actors in the country of settlement. We see initiatives where the political parties, think tanks, and civil society organisations in the country of origin organise workshops and conferences to encourage the diaspora to act as bridges between the two contexts and foster positive change. In other cases, where one party in the conflict is criminalised and stigmatised, we observe that such labels either deter the second generation from participating or prevent them from having open discussions surrounding the very concepts of peace and reconciliation.
Diaspora youth’s involvement in movements such as LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party), even during times of peacebuilding efforts, have created undesired altercations for Tamil and Kurdish youth in their countries of birth such as Canada, France or Germany as these groups were criminalised and designated as terrorist organisations by international organisations.[9]
Conclusion: Second and third generation building peace transnationally
Second- and third-generation transnational participation in peacebuilding efforts only occurs sometimes. The homeland must have an open political and social landscape for their contribution. The political elite and the local populations need to accept diaspora interventions as legitimate. Also, members of second- and third-generation diaspora must find channels to make such interventions. Fragmentations within the diaspora and stigmatisation of their political movement or ethnic/religious/ideological groups not only in the homeland context but also in the country of settlement might hinder their genuine engagement efforts.
Furthermore, the lack of institutional efforts inherent to the diaspora or the homeland may make it harder for the second and third generations to impact the processes significantly. Transnational advocacy might bring some visibility and demonstrate support for peacebuilding. However, such efforts might translate into something other than meaningful change in the homeland context. Diaspora leadership and sustained and extensive networks with homeland actors become vital for continued diaspora engagement in positive change. Building trust and establishing such relationships require long-term investment by diasporas in both countries of origin and settlement contexts.
Diasporas cannot contribute to peacebuilding in the homeland without forging meaningful collaborations with local actors
Armed conflict or violent encounters between diaspora groups are rare, but many examples confirm such assumptions. The recent Muslim and Hindu violent encounters in Leicester, United Kingdom, cannot be interpreted separately from Indian politics and homeland politicians’ rhetoric towards each group. Similarly, the escalation of conflicts in the country of origin might spur violent encounters in the diaspora, as the recent example of Nagorno-Karabakh has demonstrated. Armenian, Turkish and Azeri diaspora youth attacked each other at protest events in France and the United States.
Diasporas might not be actors at the negotiation table or be at the frontline of peacebuilding efforts in the homeland. Conflict resolution or management approach might perceive their role as minimal. However, diasporas have much to offer if we approach peacebuilding from a conflict transformation lens. Diaspora engagement in peacebuilding can take many shapes and forms and is a long-term process. Transnational activism that includes advocacy, justice-seeking, and mobilisation for issues such as human rights eventually contributes to creating awareness at home and abroad and demonstrates a willingness to bring peace and justice.
Diasporas cannot contribute to peacebuilding in the homeland without forging meaningful collaborations with local actors. However, it is essential to underline that peacebuilding efforts should not be confined to the borders of the homeland. In the age of diasporas, we observe that conflict dynamics are recreated in the transnational space and tensions between “adversary” groups are transported or continue to be (re)produced in the homeland context. Peacebuilding efforts, therefore, need to be transnationalised to address the grievances of diaspora groups as well.
Finally, we suggest that diasporic youth can also contribute to positive change in diasporic landscapes and address conflict dynamics in diasporic landscapes. Peacebuilding efforts in contemporary times cannot be a one-directional exchange between diasporas and countries of origin; they must also be understood from a transnational lens.
[1] See studies by Bush (2008), Orjuela (2008) and Cochrane and colleagues (2009).
[2] See studies by Hess and Korf (2014), Baser (2015), Karabegović (2018), Toivanen and Baser (2020) and Toivanen (2021).
[3] See the studies by Karabegović (2018), Müller-Suleymanova (2023) and Baser and Toivanen (2024).
[4] See Toivanen (2021).
[5] See the study by Birka (2022).
[6] See Baser and Toivanen (2019) and Galipo (2018).
[7] See the study by Dizdaroğlu (2023).
[8] See the study by Toivanen (2021) and Baser (2015).
[9] See the studies by Hess and Korf (2014) and Toivanen (2021).
Photography
Juana Sánchez, Colombian exile in Barcelona, one of the protagonist of the documentary Para volverte a ver, produced by ICIP and Mandorla Films. Author: ICIP.